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While the IS literature offers rich insights into the kinds, causes and consequences of 
unethical information technology use (UITU), we know little on the degree to which legal 
intervention could mitigate UITU. Our research aims at understanding how legal intervention 
could mitigate UITU by influencing the cost-benefit analysis determining the decision to 
commit such UITU. Our contributions are twofold. First, we provide testable propositions on 
the role of legal intervention. Second, we offer an innovative take on intervention, where it is 
conceived as a multi-mechanism process that adapts to UITU as well as to evolutions in IT 
use. 
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While IT1 use has provided huge economic and social benefits, these advantages have been 
tainted by UITU. Research suggests that UITU causes harm (Chatterjee et al., 2012) and leads 
to losses for business and society (Leonard and Cronan, 2001), and challenges for managers 
(Bush et al., 2010).  
 
Accordingly, information systems and ethics scholars have called for a clearer understanding 
of concrete solutions on how to address UITU (Bush et al., 2010; Chatterjee et al., 2012; 
Stylianou et al., 2013). One of the solutions envisaged is intervention in the form of codes of 
conduct (Oz, 1992). However, there is evidence that management- or third-party-implemented 
codes of conduct are inefficient in regulating UITU (Harrington, 1996; Healy and Iles, 2002). 
Despite such evidence, there is still a dearth of empirical research exploring the extent to 
which other forms of intervention can remedy the problem. In particular, Gattiker and 
Kelley’s (1999) call for the study of legislative intervention remains unanswered. Since 
intervention has been deemed effective (Jasperson et al., 2005) and shown to influence the 
ethics of decision-making (Bommer et al., 1987; Leonard et al., 2004), we pose the following 
research question: how can legal intervention mitigate UITU by influencing the cost–benefit 
analysis that determines the decision to commit UITU. For this purpose, we build on Gray 
(2008), and contend that intervention is a formalized enactment that a commonly agreed-upon 
third party develops in order to influence the behaviors of IT users in such a way as to ensure 
a specific course of action in line with the ethical norms of the larger community. 
 
To pursue our aim, we borrowed the theoretical lens of RCT from the field of criminology. 
RCT provides a valuable framework for analyzing deviant behaviors such as UITU since it 
explores the contexts that inhibit or foster such behavior (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; 
McCarthy, 2002; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996). Given the exploratory nature of our 
investigation, we opted for a qualitative design rooted in an interpretive epistemological 
stance.  
 
We purposefully selected the case of the ethically controversial technology of ORAs. Beall 
and his colleagues (2003) define an ORA as an “online, real-time dynamic auction between a 
buying organization and a group of pre-qualified suppliers who compete against each other to 
win the business to supply goods or services that have clearly defined specifications for 
design, quantity, quality, delivery, and related terms and conditions. These suppliers compete 
by bidding against each other online over the Internet, using specialized software by 
submitting successively lower priced bids during a scheduled time period” (Beall et al., 2003, 
p. 7). The technology provides a sensitizing empirical setting for our research question. 
Indeed, ORAs have been identified by academics (Charki et al., 2011; Emiliani, 2005), 
practitioners (Atkinson, 2003) and legal experts (Van Eecke and Skouma, 2006) as the 
technology that has led to the most serious unethical usages in information technology.  
 
Our study offers two main theoretical contributions to the information systems literature. 
First, we provide testable propositions regarding the role of legal intervention, and discuss its 
expected complex and paradoxical effects on UITU and IT use more generally. According to 
the intervention being investigated, we also offer an innovative take on it as a dynamic, multi-
mechanism process that can adapt to UITU as well as to the evolutions in IT use. 
                                                 
1 We abbreviate the following terms in this paper: information technology (IT), unethical information technology 




Theoretical Background  
In this section, we further elaborate on the research gap by detailing why legal intervention 
might be an effective mode of intervention in relation to UITU and then presenting RCT, our 
theoretical lens for the empirical study.  
 
Intervention and UITU  
 
Jones (1991) provided one of the most widely used definitions of unethical behaviors: “a 
decision that is either illegal and or morally unacceptable to the larger community” (p. 367). 
The specific concept of UITU was first evoked in the information systems literature by 
Chatterjee (2005), who drew on the seminal work of Mason (1986) to suggest that UITU 
refers to the violation of one or more pillars associated with ethics in the information age: 
privacy, accuracy, property, and access. However, IS research deals with a broad range of 
UITU that falls within Jones’s (1991) broader definition and includes computer abuse (Straub 
and Nance, 1990), software piracy (Moores and Chang, 2006), unethical use of sales 
technology (Bush et al., 2010), breaches of privacy and intellectual property (Stylianou et al. 
2013), deceiving suppliers (Charki et al., 2011) and computer abuse in organizations (Straub 
and Nance, 1990). Accordingly, we define UITU as technology use that is either illegal or 
morally unacceptable to the larger community. This is consistent with definitions that describe 
unethical behaviors as abuse related to the use of IT (Straub and Nance, 1990).  
 
In the context of organizations, intervention with respect to UITU often takes the form of 
business codes.2 In the case of IT use, business codes are seen as a necessary intervention to 
promote good business practices (Payne and Landry, 2005). Issued by IT managers or senior 
managers, they aim to clarify responsibilities (Johnson and Mulvey, 1995; Oz, 1992) and 
influence behavior (Leonard and Cronan, 2001). However, despite initial enthusiasm (Oz, 
1992), prior research has indicated that they have a limited impact on UITU. Harrington 
(1996) found that both generic codes and specific IS codes in nine US-based organizations 
had no impact on computer abuse: employees lacked awareness of the codes or the codes 
were in conflict with sub-group norms. Healy and Iles (2002) concluded that business codes 
were ineffective in regulating UITU because ethical IT use was considered secondary to 
efficient operations by users.  
 
However, while business codes have been shown to have a limited effect on UITU, we 
contend that the potential of legal intervention is more significant. Indeed, Gattiker and Kelley 
(1999) called on legislators to find ways to enforce intervention, notably in situations where 
UITU is not perceived by perpetrators as abusive. Indeed, legal intervention has been depicted 
as an important determinant in many ethical decisions (Bommer et al., 1987). Here, the power 
at the source of the intervention is also a key factor in its effectiveness (Jasperson et al., 
2005). At the same time, legal intervention has been portrayed as particularly influential in 
determining ethical actions (Leonard et al., 2004) and unethical decisions (Bommer et al., 
1987) through the rules and norms it enunciates.  
 
RCT as a theoretical lens 
The central premise of RCT (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; McCarthy, 2002; Paternoster and 
Simpson, 1996) is that the decision to commit a deviant act is understood as the outcome of a 
cost–benefit analysis by individuals who attempt to maximize their well-being as they 
                                                 
2 The literature uses different terms, such as “code of conduct,” “code of ethics,” and “business code.” In line with Kaptein 
and Schwartz (2008), we refer to this intervention mechanism as a “business code.”  
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compare the benefits of the deviant act with the cost of the penalties and social outcomes that 
may ensue (Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Piquero and Hickman, 2002).  
 
More precisely, McCarthy (2002) explains that a decision to offend on the part of self-
interested individuals is influenced by people’s preferences, their attitude to risk, and their 
assessment of an illegal opportunity's availability, cost and benefits versus a legitimate 
opportunity's availability, cost, and potential for realizing the same or comparable returns. 
Taken together, these parameters influence the likelihood of a crime occurring. This 
likelihood is greater when the utility of the crime is greater than its associated costs. 
Conversely, the likelihood of a crime occurring will be lower when its costs outmatch its 
expected utility (Paternoster and Bachman, 2001).  
 
Moreover, RCT theory delineates the different types of cost associated with crime in terms of 
punishment. These costs include legal sanctions (Nagin, 1998), economic costs such as loss of 
income (Grogger, 1991), and other costs such as guilt, shame (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990) 
and social rejection (Nagin, 1998). RCT suggests that crime can be prevented not by changing 
offenders but by changing aspects of the context in which offenses typically occur—in our 
case, by legal intervention. 
 
Insights gained from RCT have already made a significant contribution to the information 
systems and security literature. For instance, Li, Zhang and Sarathy (2010) found that 
employees’ intention to comply with an internet use policy is influenced more by the 
probability of an offense being detected than by the severity of the penalties likely to be 
imposed. In another example, Bulgurcu et al., (2010) found that employees’ overall 
assessment of the consequences of abuse is based on their assessment of the benefits and costs 
of compliance and the cost of non-compliance; this assessment explains their attitude towards 
compliance with the organization’s information security policy.  
 
Building on this review of RCT in Criminology and its application in the IS literature, we 
contend that three main principles of RCT are fundamental to our analysis of UITU. First, 
offenders’ actions are consistent with the maximization of their utility. This is assessed ex-ante 
as they weigh up and compare the costs and benefits linked to the deviant behavior in 
question. Second, the appraisal and resulting choices are made on the basis of imperfect 
information about both the costs and the benefits of the crime carried out in a context of 
uncertainty. Third, offenders make their decisions at individual level. Introducing RCT allows 
us to fine-tune our research objective. In order to understand how legal intervention could 
mitigate UITU, we build on interviews with the various actors to understand the extent to 
which legal intervention influences the cost–benefit analysis that determines the decision to 
commit such UITU. 
 
Methodology 
Numerous articles have exposed the extensive UITU linked to ORAs. These include allowing 
unqualified suppliers to bid, obliging suppliers to honor unfairly low bids, misrepresenting 
facts and phantom bidding, threatening incumbent suppliers with the choice of bidding or 
losing their contract, and including buyers as bidders (e.g., Charki and Josserand, 2008; 
Emiliani, 2005; Giampietro and Emiliani, 2007; Tassabehji et al., 2006).  
 
In this paper, our research question examines how legal intervention can mitigate UITU. More 
precisely, our aim is to understand how legal intervention can influence the cost–benefit 
analysis that determines the decision to commit UITU. Given the exploratory nature of our 
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question, a qualitative approach seemed to be a logical choice, particularly since the study 
examines real, hard-to-access data on unethical usage of IT associated with the very sensitive 
arena (Dickson-Swift et al., 2009) of buyer–supplier relationships, in which the financial 
stakes are high. 
 
Qualitative designs are widely accepted in the information systems literature (Myers and 
Avison, 2002) and in situations where researchers need to capture rich and subtle patterns of 
complex detail in order to draw closer to the actors’ interpretations (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2011). For our purposes, we wanted to go beyond the perspective of IT users alone and to 
understand the world from the viewpoint of those studied (Pratt, 2009). More specifically, in 
order to make sense of our results, we used an interpretive approach (Walsham, 1995), since 
the interpretation of the effects of intervention is deeply entrenched in the actors’ contexts and 
the subjective comprehension of ORA technology. Embedding this approach in a single case-
study design enabled us to grasp the ORA technology as a system of understanding of the 
social interactions between actors (Klein and Myers, 1999). Single case studies are well 
accepted in the information systems literature (e.g., Berente and Yoo, 2012; Sarker et al., 
2012; Seidel et al., 2013). From an IT artifact standpoint, we examined ORAs from the 
“ensemble” view, in which the technology is embedded in a complex and dynamic social 
context (Orlikowksi and Iacono, 2001). This “ensemble” view incorporates the social 
influences that shape the way different groups engage with the technology, and in so doing it 
enables interpretive researchers to see reality as an inter-subjective construction of shared 
human cognitive construction (Walsham, 1995).  
 
Context  
As the principle of contextualization is highly important to facilitate understanding of the 
subsequent results (Klein and Myers, 1999), we present a detailed overview of our context, 
while positioning it in the realm of information ethics.  
 
The field of information ethics has benefitted from increased scholarly attention in recent 
years due to the proliferation of a range of ethical challenges, such as information systems 
misuse (D’Arcy et al., 2009) and information security policy violation (Siponen and Vance, 
2010). Notwithstanding the diversity of ethical challenges associated with the wide array of 
digital technologies, it is difficult to gather all forms of UITU in one unique empirical context. 
Accordingly, we decided to focus on an acute and revealing case of ORA technology, which 
we expected to prove interesting since it represents one of the most severe cases of UITU that 
exist. It provided us with the basis for a theoretical contribution that could make sense in other 
contexts of UITU.  
 
Initially, ORA technology was hailed by its creators as being very useful for buyers and 
suppliers alike. It was presented to buyers as a means of widening their sourcing horizons 
(Daly and Nath, 2005), reducing administrative and logistical costs (Hur et al., 2007), and 
enhancing purchasing performance (Jap, 2003). Suppliers were told that it would provide 
access to new markets, compress time to market, and reduce transaction costs (Smart and 
Harrison, 2003).  
 
From a technical standpoint, ORA technology is administered by an online market maker that 
provides a technical platform to host the online bidding event. In this case, the platform is 
called Agentrics.3 The most famous concept of an online auction is that of eBay, with an 
                                                 
3Agentrics was acquired by NeoGrid (https://www.neogrid.com/uk)  
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online forward auction where a single supplier solicits ascending online bids from buyers. 
However, the ORA concept is based on what is known as a Dutch auction, in which a number 
of pre-selected professional suppliers are invited to an online auction by professional buyers. 
Prices are put forward in a descending manner until the best price (from the buyer’s vantage 
point, i.e., the lowest bid) is reached, with no additional bids from other suppliers after the 
time limit. This practice has been used in virtually every major industry, including the retail 
and automotive industries (Jap, 2007).  
 
Despite its initial promise, the ORA system was misappropriated and now bears the dubious 
honor of being the technology that is most widely associated with unethical IT use 
(Giampietro and Emiliani, 2007). This naturally triggered numerous negative reactions in the 
business press. The case is revealing because it is a morally intense issue with high stakes for 
the IT users (both buyers and suppliers) concerned (see Table 1 for details on UITU before, 
during and after ORAs). 
 
Table 1. Review of UITU associated with ORAs (adapted from Emiliani, 2005, p. 527) 
Before the online bidding event 
 
During the online bidding event 
 
After the online bidding event 
Ambiguous or shifting auction 
rules 
Threatening incumbent suppliers to 
bid or risk losing the work 
Contract terms and conditions 
changed between request for 
quote and award 
Incomplete or inaccurate 
specifications provided 




Unit prices driven down with no 
intention of switching sources 
Unqualified suppliers allowed to 
bid 
Only some portions of the items 
in a bid package awarded 
Phantom bidding (buyer or market 
maker pretends to be a supplier) 
Specifications relief given to 
winning bidders 
Suppliers forced to honor 
unreasonably low prices 
Repetitive re-bidding to drive 
down prices 
Internal departments included as 
bidders 
Bidders not informed of outcomes 
 
With regard to our research question, we noted that the practice of allowing unqualified 
suppliers, phantom bidders or even the buyers themselves to bid was the most commonly 
cited and damaging UITU for suppliers.  
 
Our study was located in France where, as in other contexts, many anomalies had been noted 
in the use of ORA technology. As UITU had reached a considerably high level, the French 
government voted through the first legal intervention in June 2005 with the so-called Dutreil 
Law, which was published in August 2005 (Official Journal of the Republic of France No. 
179, 3rd August 2005, page 12639, NOR: PMEX0500079L; see Appendix C). The law was 
implemented in France but was not followed up in the rest of the EU.  
 
As some buying organizations tried to circumvent the legal intervention, the legislator 
intervened again in the same year (Official Journal of the Republic of France, No. 303, 30th 
December 2005, page 20557, NOR: PMEA0510001C) by introducing an amendment to deal 
with some of the loopholes identified in the first intervention (see Appendix D).  
 
Data collection 
As the topic investigated is highly sensitive and involves hard-to-disclose information, we 
drew upon a prior case of collaboration with a large French retailer to convince our key 




Before beginning our interviews, we searched the French and European business press and 
legal publications in order to understand the whole story from the appearance of UITU 
through to the enactment of the legal intervention. We began data collection more than two 
years after the implementation of the law (in April 2008), a period when IT users developed 
their interpretations of the intervention and the extent of its usefulness. We gathered the data 
over an eight-month period from April 2008 until December of the same year.  
 
Following an initial discussion about our research question with our key informant, we 
decided to interview buyers who had used the technology between early 2006 and April 2008, 
as we were initially interested in making sense of how the law can influence the cost–benefit 
analysis determining the decision to commit UITU. A majority of these informants had been 
using ORAs before the intervention or had heard stories about the extent of its use. These 
buyers would therefore be able to make better sense of the intervention. We began by 
interviewing the selected buyers. We also asked them to name at least one supplier with 
whom they had used ORA technology following the legal intervention. Our key informant 
also gave us access to the internal and external (market maker) initiators of the technology. 
This gave us access to difficult-to-obtain data. 
 
At the same time, as interpretive researchers, we adopted a posture that preserved openness to 
the field data (Walsham, 1995); we saw IT as a system of social interactions that aimed at 
understanding sense-making by multiple stakeholders interested in the ORA technology 
(Hirschheim et al., 1995). Thus, we wanted access not only to those who used the technology 
(buyers and suppliers) but also to those who influenced the use of the technology directly (IT 
initiators). Furthermore, even though our goal was to understand the degree to which a legal 
intervention influences the cost–benefit analysis determining the decision to commit UITU 
from the vantage point of the focal IT users (buyers and suppliers), we also sought the 
perspective of other actors to gain a broader understanding of this complex issue. We thus 
included interviews with institutional actors and lawyers since they influenced and made 
sense of the intervention. Table A1 explains the roles played by each category of informant in 
detail.  
 
In order to garner a comprehensive understanding of the question, we relied mainly on semi-
structured interviews. This type of interview is frequently used in information systems 
research, in particular to investigate under-researched topics so as to obtain information that 
may otherwise be hard to gather (Myers and Newman, 2007). Moreover, since we were 
dealing with a very sensitive issue, we knew that the use of narrative techniques (Chase, 
2011) could be appropriate as they are particularly effective in conveying what actors cannot 
reveal directly to researchers. We thus relied on broad questions covering the main objectives 
of the interviews, letting informants present their own perspective. The main objectives of the 
interviews were:  
 
a) to make sense of the way the use of IT is initially formalized and to understand the 
limits of this approach,  
b) to explore the revisions fostered by the intervention and that influenced the sense-
making of our groups of informants, and thus the cost–benefit analysis determining the 
decision to commit UITU or not,  
c) to search for any emergent and unexpected outcomes or evolutions associated with the 





Appendix A summarizes the data collected and the categories of informants interviewed. We 
interviewed 63 representatives from five categories of informants who had a direct or indirect 
role in framing the legal intervention and/or the interpretation of UITU: i.e., buyers, suppliers, 
IT initiators, key institutional actors who played leading roles in the crafting of the 
intervention, and key international legal experts in ORA technology.  
 
On average, our interviews lasted 33 minutes with the buyers, 31 minutes with the suppliers, 
48 minutes with the IT initiators, 55 minutes with the institutional actors, and 53 minutes with 
the lawyers. All of the interviews were recorded and then fully transcribed. In total, 689 pages 
of data were produced. 
 
Data analysis 
Our objective was not to test a positivist theoretical framework (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 
1991) but rather to discover a new theoretical framework as it emerged from our data. This 
process, in line with the recommendation by Klein and Myers (1999), helped us to interpret 
the data so as to generate empirically embedded theoretical propositions and insights.  
 
We carried out a code-based content analysis, which allowed us to analyze data by 
categorizing verbatim into meaningful sections and sub-sections. Although our study did not 
follow a grounded theory method, we opted for a three-stage process of open coding, axial 
coding, and selective coding. This approach is widely accepted in the information systems 
literature when mobilizing interpretive studies (see, for instance, Berente and Yoo, 2012; 
Henfridsson and Lind, 2014; Racherla and Mandviwalla, 2013). We used the N-vivo software 
package because of its elasticity, multiple coding potential through rich data, and information 
cross-referencing tools (Richards, 1999). Appendix B recapitulates the resulting first-order 
codes, second-order codes, and aggregated categories.  
 
Our first phase of open analysis sought to unravel the high level categories of constructs. With 
our research question in mind, namely, understanding the extent to which the intervention was 
able to influence the cost–benefit analysis determining the decision to commit UITU, we 
examined interview transcripts line by line. Our main focus was on understanding how 
informants interpreted the effects of the law on the cost–benefit analysis determining the 
decision to commit UITU. All the excerpts that referred to the same unit of meaning were 
ascribed to a particular code (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Simultaneously, we tried to stay 
open to any potentially new and important constructs in our data. We pursued this process 
until we reached theoretical saturation, that is to say, until formerly identified constructs 
reappeared in the data (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) and we thus felt confident that the data had 
“earned their way” into the theoretical scheme (Morse, 2004). We also searched for potential 
contradictory statements between informants. As per our research objective, we found 
accounts of mechanisms explaining the potential impact of the law on existing UITU as well 
as some discrepancies between groups of actors whereby mechanisms were interpreted as 
efficient or not. All discrepancies were accounted for in the results section. Thanks to the 
open coding approach adopted, our data also revealed unexpected findings such as the 
emergence of new UITU, the broader impact on IT use, and the adaptation of the law to new 
UITU. All the codes that emerged from this phase were labeled first-order codes.  
 
Our second phase consisted of axial coding, where we sought to establish linkages across the 
first-order codes with the objectives of ascribing first-order codes to second-order codes and 
gaining a better understanding of causal links between the concepts in context. Both 
objectives were informed by our theoretical framework. Indeed, while ascribing first-order 
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codes to second-order codes, we used broad categories of the cost–benefit analysis, such as 
benefit, cost, or risk of being caught. Our interpretation of the causal links between concepts 
was also informed by RCT reasoning: we were able to make sense of our informants’ 
statements based on how they related to the cost–benefit analysis. This approach provided us 
with an initial understanding of the causal links between variables. We were also attentive to 
divergences between actors and thus to which mechanisms were salient in different groups of 
actors’ interpretations. At this stage, it became clear which mechanisms were identified by all 
actors, a majority of buyers, a majority of suppliers, or mainly buyers or suppliers.  
 
Our third phase consisted of selective coding, where all the second-order codes were grouped 
into aggregated dimensions. This enabled us to provide strong explanations for the observed 
links between the aggregated dimensions. This process served the emergence of a new 
framework (Corbin and Strauss, 2008), comprised of empirically embedded propositions and 
insights. 
 
During the data analysis phase, two of the three researchers were involved in the coding 
operations. There were extensive and frequent discussions between all the researchers on the 
coding outcomes (categorizing, eliminating, merging, etc.). This approach enabled us to 
conciliate contradictory interpretations and to consolidate our propositions into a meaningful 
framework that gave a nuanced answer to the research question. However, we were conscious 
that the analysis of data emanating from interpretive research is not confined to facts but also 
involves the respondents’ and researchers’ own subjectivities (Walsham, 1995). We addressed 
this challenge in two ways. First, our data analysis explicitly recognized and highlighted any 
possible tension between our informants’ interpretations. Second, we provided an appropriate 
rationale each time we noticed any tension between and/or within our groups of informants.  
 
Moreover, in view of our interpretive epistemological approach, we focused on identifying the 
presence of codes and their potential relationships. We did not search for frequencies of 
occurrence, as qualitative research is concerned primarily with analyzing the meaning of the 
constructs emanating from the empirical results (Van Maanen, 1979). With the abstraction 
principle in mind (Klein and Myers, 1999), our study drew on Walsham’s (1993) argument 
that the legitimacy of inferences extracted from one case does not hinge upon statistical 
representativeness, but rather relies “on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning 
used in describing the results from the cases, and in drawing conclusions from them” (p. 15). 
At the same time, Table A2 provides a detailed explanation of the validity of our interpretive 
approach according to the criteria mobilized by the seven principles of the seminal paper by 
Klein and Myers (1999).  
 
Finally, in order to strengthen our contribution to theory, we generated theoretical 
propositions that draw specific implications. In a recent review of case study usage in the 
information systems literature, Tsang (2014) argued that this approach is consistent with the 
meaning of generalization. In line with the reasoning method used by interpretive scholars 
such as Geertz (1973) and Van Maanen (1983), we thus went beyond our informants’ first-




Our data analysis shows that three dimensions of legal intervention— the formalization of 
UITU and its associated costs, the visibility of IT use and the amplification of the effect on the 
organization’s reputation— helped to influence the cost-benefit analysis determining the 
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decision to commit UITU. Importantly, these three dimensions triggered differentiated 
responses from the two main categories of actors concerned: the potential victims and those 
who might benefit from UITU. In addition, our data analysis showed that the legal 
intervention gave rise to unexpected effects on IT use, which included triggering new UITU 
and the discontinuance of IT use. 
 
 
Formalization of UITU and associated costs 
Formalization clarifies what constitutes UITU and its associated costs when the offender is 
caught. This can affect the cost–benefit analysis by dissipating ambiguity when an offense has 
been committed and increasing its perceived cost. However, while suppliers tend to share this 
view, there is little consensus between buyers. 
 
The legal intervention formalized the meaning of UITU by defining precisely what constitutes 
the latter and clarifying the severe sanctions associated with such offenses:  
  
In addition to the obligation to pay damages, the Law also lays down severe prison sentences 
(2 years) and fines (€30,000) for price manipulation concerning reverse e-auctions, especially 
if the price manipulation takes place through one of the following means:  
- by disseminating deceptive or libelous information by any means;  
-  by introducing onto the market or soliciting either offers intended to trouble the market 
prices, or unbalanced high or low bids in relation to the prices asked by the sellers or service 
providers;  
-  by adopting any other fraudulent means.  
Any attempted price manipulation is subject to the same (Dutreil Law, Appendix C).  
 
Interestingly, institutional actors and lawyers were aware that existing general legislation 
could actually provide adequate sanctions. However, as noted in an EU report, “Although 
national legal rules apply to unfair commercial practices in B2B e-markets, their existence and 
enforceability is not obvious to the e-market actors” (Van Eekce and Skouma, 2006, p. 144). 
Lawyers and institutional actors involved in the crafting of the law agreed with this statement, 
suggesting that “marketplaces often don't realize that this law applies to them” (Lawyer). 
Thus, while the intrinsic cost of an offense has not necessarily been affected, what has 
changed is the perception of such costs by potential offenders.  
 
Suppliers highlighted the fact that formalization clarified the meaning of UITU: “the law 
draws the attention of actors to a precise point […]. The law has been published and will 
make the actors better informed and more vigilant” (Supplier). Consequently, these IT users 
are now more aware of what is ethically acceptable or not, and are thus able to identify the 
risks associated with such behaviors. The suppliers also considered that the clarification of the 
costs associated with UITU dramatically changed the stakes for potential offenders, thereby 
mitigating UITU: “The risks are enormous, and sanctions, penalties, and fines are not neutral, 
notably in sensitive periods. I think now that an actor who respects this and does not want to 
incur risks in running their business will necessarily abide by the law” (Supplier). Overall, 
suppliers perceive a dissuasive effect associated with formalization because it reduces 
ambiguity and increases perceived costs. Notwithstanding this perception, we noted a sense of 
regret on the supply side concerning the lack of timeliness of the intervention: “If we had had 
this from the start, we would have avoided so many abuses” (Supplier).  
 
Some buyers also acknowledge the importance of formally clarifying the nature and meaning 
of UITU. The new legislation formalized what was legal and what was not in precise and 
context-specific terms that applied directly to the case of ORAs. This reduced the ambiguity 
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surrounding UITU: “When a legal text is passed, you read it and it shows you the way. It’s no 
longer a rumor that guides your interpretation of events” (Buyer). Further, some buyers were 
aware of the limits of the business code both in terms of defining UITU and the sanctions, and 
formalization helped to remedy this limitation: “Yes, a code of ethics does not suffice to tell 
here is what you need to do in order to be good. Since there are no possible sanctions, 
obviously it does not solve the entire problem” (Buyer). However, other reactions from buyers 
illustrated a different perspective. In particular, many insisted that formalization, while useful, 
did not in itself really mitigate the risk of UITU: “Yes, I think it is good in any case, to have a 
framework, I mean for anything you need a framework. This being said, even with the law, I 
don’t think this prevented people from cheating, to do fake auctions with a participant who 
would be some sort of fake bidder.” (Buyer).  
 
Our findings show divergent views of the potential impact of formalization on the cost-benefit 
analysis between buyers and suppliers. Most suppliers recognize the role of formalization in 
influencing the meaning and cost of UITU. Buyers, on the other hand, have differing views of 
the role played by formalization. While some consider that formalization reduces the 
ambiguity of UITU and increases perceived costs, many state that it does not influence 
behaviors. This suggests that formalization is likely to impact on the cost-benefit analysis in 
relation to some, but not all, buyers. Our results lead to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  Formalization of the nature of UITU and its associated sanctions will only 
affect the cost-benefit analysis of individual IT users who perceived an 
ambiguity in the definition of UITUs and associated sanctions.  
 
Visibility of IT use 
Our data revealed the importance of visibility as a key mechanism that affects the potential 
offender’s cost-benefit analysis. The intervention created visibility by introducing the 
obligation to trace all transactions, together with increased control over IT use. Visibility 
affects the cost-benefit analysis by increasing IT users’ awareness of the risk of being caught. 
 
The lawyers we interviewed stressed the importance of IT use controls as a mechanism within 
the legal intervention that influence the cost-benefit analysis associated with UITU; 
interestingly, they underlined how such controls rely on a clear definition of UITU: “Now, the 
rules are written into a law pertaining to the use of auctions. This means that the authorities 
can control the use of auctions and that the buyers will no longer want to put themselves in an 
illegal position” (Lawyer). Yet, controls are only possible, or at least are much more feasible 
if concrete traces of the transactions exist. This is why the law sets out strict guidelines about 
keeping a trace of IT use: “The buyer or the person organizing the auction records the 
auction’s progress and stores the data for a period of at least one year” (Dutreil Law). This 
creates suitable conditions for watchdog agencies to run audits and controls and thus detect 
UITU ex-post: “Users can erase their emails by deleting them. However, we can still see what 
has been destroyed over a long period of time” (Institutional). As part of the intervention, the 
watchdog agencies use their legal leverage to implement more frequent and systematic 
controls: “The legislation, the obligation for transparency and our annual control plans have 
helped us to obtain better knowledge of retailers, suppliers and abusive practices. Thus, as 
time goes on, I think that it has obliged all users to tighten up their practices and to abandon 
others” (Institutional).  
 
Suppliers embraced this vision and were fully convinced of the importance of keeping traces 
of such IT transactions in order to change the cost-benefit analysis and thus mitigate UITU: 
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“Having to register the bidding event engages the retailer to something ethical that will be 
traced in a written way so he must be careful” (Supplier). Another supplier emphasized the 
latent nature of the sanctions that deters UITU. “You will be guaranteed that is to say, you 
know very well that there is a sword of Damocles hanging over your head if you do anything” 
(Supplier). Suppliers also consider that the enactment of controls is a strong dissuasive 
mechanism: “It’s evident that the fear of controls by the authorities is a major element for us” 
(Supplier). There is a clear perception by most suppliers of the importance of tracing 
transactions in order to ensure tighter control. They agree that it increases the risks perceived 
by buyers and facilitates control. The very existence of extended controls is thus perceived as 
a deterrent against UITU. However, some suppliers add nuance to this perspective, arguing 
that they are unlikely to request controls themselves because of the power asymmetry that 
prevails between buyers and suppliers: “If a supplier is suspected of calling for controls, the 
buyers will exclude him as a form of revenge” (Supplier).  
 
Buyers concur with suppliers in stressing the impact of visibility on the cost-benefit analysis: 
“When we know that we are controlled and this can be the subject of verification and that 
there are financial sanctions, it is evident that vigilance will be increased and that we won’t 
behave like others do” (Buyer). Another buyer noted the importance of enhanced visibility on 
refraining from engaging in UITU “Today there is total transparency, there is an authority that 
controls and everything is visible. Thanks to the system, there is no way to cheat. I think that 
no one will take the risk at this point because it’s so easy to get caught…it would be suicidal 
to play with this.”  
 
Interventions by the watchdog agency based on the traces of IT use are mentioned as clear 
examples of the power granted to the agency by the law, dissuading buyers from opting for 
UITU due to the increased risk of being caught: “A couple of years ago, the authorities came 
to our headquarters and took 25 PCs. It is true that they have the power of moralization since 
they can say if you do not respect the law, you will be punished. They couldn’t do it before 
but now they can” (Buyer). Interestingly, they also mention the risk of denunciation by 
suppliers: “You know when we organize a bidding event with ten suppliers, if you are 
embarrassed in this event; there are at least nine suppliers who risk denouncing you” (Buyer). 
Buyers thus clearly perceive an increased risk of being prosecuted due to the heightened 
visibility of IT use enabled by the tracing of transactions and the enhanced control that this 
affords. 
 
Both suppliers and buyers interpret the visibility of IT use as a deterrent against UITU, as it 
increases the risk that offenders will be discovered. However, buyers tend to put more 
emphasis on the risks associated with denunciation by suppliers. Our analysis of the role of 
visibility leads us to our second proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: The more legal intervention increases the visibility of IT use through the 
combination of IT use and ex-post controls, the greater the likelihood that 
individual IT users will perceive a high risk of being caught and will thus 
refrain from engaging in UITU.  
 
Amplification of the impact on the organization’s reputation  
The impact of a discovered offense on an organization’s reputation is bolstered by the media 
exposure associated with the intervention, thus increasing the reputational cost of an offence 
for the offender’s organization. Since this affects the cost of transgression for the 




This aspect of intervention was clearly identified by the institutional actors, lawyers and IT 
initiators, who explained the importance of the reputational effect for offending organizations. 
The watchdog agency systematically exploited cases of positive controls by leveraging the 
media. For instance, one technology initiator highlighted reputation as a significant risk linked 
to UITU: “You can’t stop actors who suffer from these transgressions from speaking up and 
consequently you run a risk. First, you’re not clean about your ethics and then you run a risk 
in terms of image, and this is tremendously important for companies” (IT initiator).  
 
While suppliers did not refer spontaneously to this reputational effect, buyers’ representatives 
indicated that they considered this effect as one of the major costs for the company if caught: 
“We work in markets where you finally have fewer and fewer players and more and more 
large corporations. If we discover that someone or other is cheating, this will lead to a loss of 
trust, a boomerang effect and media exposure that will harm the organizations concerned” 
(Buyer). Buyers were well aware of the reputational aspect of the intervention. They 
explained that this organizational effect is of a high magnitude, since its repercussions extend 
well beyond a fine for a specific unethical practice, and can affect the entire company, 
particularly if the media coverage is strengthened by a systematic institutional campaign: 
“There are also media drawbacks in which the government plays a large part. It means that if 
one big actor from the retail side or the supply side commits a small transgression, you’ll have 
your name vilified in all the media and this is more expensive than a fine” (Buyer).  
 
The reputational effect, especially when amplified by institutional actors, was clearly 
perceived as a key element of the higher cost associated with legal intervention by the buyer, 
affecting their cost-benefit analysis. It was not a major element in the suppliers’ responses 
regarding UITU, however. Thus, our analysis of the role played by reputation in the cost-
benefit calculus leads us the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: The more the legal intervention amplifies the reputational effects associated 
with UITU, thus creating a reputational risk for the organization, the higher 
the cost of UITU and thus the higher the likelihood that IT users will refrain 
from engaging in UITU.  
 
Emergent effects of intervention on IT use and adaptability of the intervention  
Notwithstanding the previous effects of the intervention in terms of cost-benefit analysis, our 
data analysis also showed the existence of emergent and unexpected impacts on IT use. At 
first, IT users, especially buyers, attempted to negotiate their way around the intervention by 
exploiting loopholes in the law. This led to an amendment of the legal intervention. Our data 
also showed that in response to the complexity introduced by the intervention, some users 
chose to reduce or discontinue ORA use.  
 
Some of the buyers attempted to circumvent the intervention with respect to its timeframe and 
scope. For instance, the legal intervention doubled the deadline required for notice of a 
contract’s termination if the latter was made at the end of an online bidding event. Buyers 
tried to bypass the time constraints introduced by the intervention by sending a confirmation 
letter and a termination letter simultaneously at the start of the transaction: “I mean they’ve 
decided that they’ll send a termination letter to the supplier so that the contract will be 
cancelled one year after its start date in such a way as to announce the notice immediately, 
and to double it in line with the law […] but in fact, it’s kind of skirting around the law” 
(ORA Coordinator). Buyers also tried to negotiate the scope of the intervention by shifting the 
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location of the online bidding event to another jurisdiction: “A retailer who is present in 
numerous countries with adapted logistical circuits can organize the bidding event in 
Germany or Spain, and then send the goods involved in the auction to France” (Buyer). 
Suppliers acknowledged the risk that buyers could bypass the law: “in all cases, they end up 
managing to dodge the law for one simple reason, namely that we need the buyers, whereas 
they just need to buy” (Supplier). This interpretation was confirmed by another buyer, who 
confessed that there was a systematic determination to discover the extent to which the 
intervention could be negotiated by circumventing the law. “After the law was passed, we 
spent some time figuring out what we could do to get round it” (Buyer). There is thus strong 
evidence that buyers actively attempted to maintain some of the practices targeted by the law, 
and also developed some new UITU such as asking suppliers to sign immediate termination 
letters to avoid the increased term of notice. This analysis leads us to the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 4a: The more IT users discover loopholes in the legal intervention, the higher the 
likelihood that they will attempt to get round it by adapting their practices.  
 
The legislator understood the need to endow the intervention with the potential to evolve in 
line with stakeholders’ ability to dodge it. Thus, reacting to attempts to bypass it, the legislator 
adapted the law. First, the price that offenders would have to pay in the event that they were 
caught cheating rose significantly from €30,000 to €2 million. Second, the scope of the 
intervention was changed to apply to any product sold in France, regardless of the country in 
which the IT was being used: “The reverse auction venue can easily be moved and is therefore 
not significant. Accordingly, the applicable law is the law where the prejudice occurred, in 
other words, the law of the place where the supplier incurs prejudice” (Second legal 
intervention, No. 303, Page 20557, Clause No. 123; see Appendix D).  
 
Our analysis of the emergence of new UITUs and the resulting adaptation of the law leads us 
to the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 4b: Because IT users alter their practices on an ongoing basis; intervention     
against UITU is likely to trigger new UITU, resulting in the need for further 
intervention. 
 
Simultaneously, our results revealed that the intervention had some emergent and unexpected 
effects on IT use. Some buyers took the extreme position of simply not using the technology 
because of the increased complexity resulting from formalization: “It’s true that the number of 
auctions has decreased. Because of the law, they’re getting harder to organize” (Buyer). 
Others pointed to a decline in the use of ORAs, acknowledging that the reduction in IT use 
was due to the growing complexity of organizing online bidding events: “ORA use is 
decreasing […], the mission of the buyer is becoming more complex because the request for 
quotations has to be solid, very precise, and the selected suppliers have to be really 
comparable” (Suppliers).  
 
Proposition 5a: When attempting to mitigate UITU, legal interventions can result in 
increased complexity of technology use, thus leading to the limitation or 
discontinuance of IT use.  
 
Buyers also argued that since visibility creates a perceived risk of control, it also contributes 
to a reduction in the use of the technology. This was confirmed by the ORA Coordinator who 
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organizes all the bidding events for the buyers at the retailer’s head office. Thus, he confirmed 
the discontinuance of ORA use, attributing it to the significant increase in the new risks 
associated with the technology’s use: “we’re really concerned that even though we did our job 
properly, the supplier will complain, triggering new investigations that no one will appreciate; 
it’s a real concern for us to deal with […]; all these regulations increase the risk. We do 
everything we can to avoid it, especially as using ORAs increases the chances of an 
investigation. So we organize fewer ORAs to avoid the risk” (ORA Coordinator). Suppliers 
shared a similar interpretation since they said they had witnessed a significant decrease in 
ORA use. They suggested that the enhanced intervention led to a decline in willingness to use 
the IT because of its complexity. For instance, one supplier indicated: “I have seen the 
regression in terms of auction use …this is explained by the heightened degree of complexity 
in the buyers’ job because they need to display ultra-correct use of the technology” 
(Supplier). 
 
Proposition 5b: By attempting to mitigate UITU, the legal intervention can result in an 
increase in the perceived risk of technology use, thus leading to the limitation 
or discontinuance of IT use.  
 
Our findings show the extent to which intervention should not be seen as a static endeavor, 
but rather, should be considered as a dynamic and systematic effort that needs to be adapted to 
the way IT users negotiate the IT artifact. It can result in unexpected effects such as new 
UITUs and limitation or discontinuance of use.  
 
Discussion 
In this section, we build on our findings to discuss our propositions and suggest research 
avenues that deal with UITU. Our results show that the legal intervention can influence the 
cost-benefit analysis which determines the decision to commit UITU through three main 
mechanisms: formalization, visibility of IT use, and amplification of the reputational effect. 
We theoretically discuss the contribution of these mechanisms and the associated propositions 
and consequences of this in terms of intervention. Table 2 below summarizes the findings of 
our study and the links with the propositions. We discuss below the main elements that 
constitute our findings: the three mechanisms through which intervention operates – namely 
formalization, visibility and amplification of the reputational effect, the new UITU and 
adaptability of the intervention, and the emergent effect on IT use. 
 
Table 2. Main findings and propositions 
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First, our results show that there are two aspects to formalization: clarification of the nature of 
UITUs and enunciation of the sanctions associated with these UITUs. Our findings indicate 
that the majority of suppliers and some buyers consider that formalization affects the cost-
benefit analysis of buyers and is therefore a potential deterrent to UITUs.  
 
For actors who agree that this is the case, formalization is interpreted as clarifying the 
meaning of UITU, thus reducing ambiguity about offending acts; it also clarifies the cost 
incurred when an offender is caught, thus increasing the perceived cost of offenses. As 
formalization refers to the process of codifying and enforcing input, output and behaviors 
(Ouchi, 1979), it can facilitate IT users’ sense-making by clarifying the ethical standards 
associated with IT use, which has been shown as an important driver of ethical behaviors in a 
broader context (Kaptein, 2008). According to Vlaar et al. (2006), such formalization helps to 
demarcate what is acceptable and what is not in a specific context.  
 
At the same time, we know that RCT accepts that actors’ assessments and resulting choices 
are made on the basis of imperfect information which introduces uncertainty into the RCT 
calculus (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Nagin, 1998). Formalization has the merit of lifting part 
of the definitional ambiguity surrounding UITU and the associated sanctions. There is thus a 
strong theoretical rationale to support the idea that it can change the individual perception of 
the costs and benefits associated with the transgression that triggered a change in the course of 




However, in our case, this impact on the cost-benefit analysis was only perceived by some of 
the buyers. There are two possible explanations for the lack of perceived impact of 
formalization by some buyers. First, the key utility of formalization is its informative function 
for buyers who were unaware of the types of sanctions they could incur and for which uses of 
the technology. It is thus quite possible that buyers who were more knowledgeable about 
UITU and the associated sanctions according to non-specific regulations were less affected by 
the clarification. Second, one of the key effects of the formalization was clarification of the 
gravity of the sanctions incurred. Indeed, the RCT theory deems sanctions to be an 
appropriate instrument with which to deal with deviant behaviors (Nagin and Paternoster, 
1993) since higher stakes are associated with deviant behaviors (Paternoster and Pogarsky, 
2009). Thus, the combined effect of definitional clarification and stronger sanctions is likely 
to mitigate the cost-benefit analysis determining UITU. However, there is evidence from the 
IS literature that the severity of sanctions is not a key deterrent to UITU compared to threat 
appraisal (Pahnila et al., 2007; Li et al., 2010). This could explain why the clarification of the 
level of such sanctions was less of a deterrent for a certain number of buyers who were 
already aware of the risk of sanctions. 
 
The theoretical discussion of our results thus suggests a clear delineation of the effect of 
formalization on the perceived risk of sanctions, and the effect of the perceived gravity of 
sanctions. Concretely, we suggest that formalization can influence the cost-benefit analysis of 
actors who perceived an ambiguity in the definition of UITUs, and thus in the risk of 
sanctions. In view of our findings and the emerging literature in IS, lifting the ambiguity of 
the gravity of sanctions might be less of a deterrent than previously supposed. This is 
important since it partly contradicts the prediction of RCT according to which increasing the 
perceived level of sanctions would have a stronger impact on the cost-benefit analysis. While 
these emerging results need to be quantitatively tested, they open up interesting research 
avenues to qualify the relative impact of the variables included in the cost-benefit analysis 
conducted by potential offenders.  
 
Second, our case study also indicates that the visibility of IT use can affect the cost-benefit 
analysis by buyers, thereby contributing to UITU mitigation. This interpretation was shared 
by both buyers and suppliers. In our context, visibility corresponds to the creation of records 
of the transactions and increased risks of controls. This naturally affects buyers’ calculations, 
since it increases the ex-ante perception of the risk of being caught. The information systems 
literature has already recognized the importance of visibility—defined as the creation of 
records— in making a decision regarding IT adoption (Karahanna et al., 1999; Moore and 
Benbasat, 1991) but without linking it to UITU mitigation. Our data shows that the continuous 
tracing of IT use plays an important role in mitigating UITU as it directly increases the risk of 
being identified. Visibility is also increased by the risk of controls that will leverage the 
records made. This is consistent with the conclusions drawn by other scholars in the context 
of illegal Internet use, where the likelihood of detection was found to be a strong deterrent for 
UITU (Li et al., 2010).  
 
Our findings indicate that the combination of tracing records of IT use and ex-post controls 
creates a situation, specific to the context of IT use, in which actors combine the risk of being 
caught in the act with that of being caught ex-post over an extended period of time. This 
clearly affects their cost-benefit analysis, increasing the perceived risk of being caught and 
thus providing a strong deterrent against UITU.  
 
A third mechanism contributing to the mitigation of UITU is that of the amplification of the 
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reputational effect. This emanates from the communication outcomes linked to the 
intervention, leading to a higher reputational cost for the offenders’ organization. Our findings 
show that the costs associated with UITU can extend beyond the scope of the individual 
offender to that of his/her organization, resulting in a negative reputational effect. 
Amplification of the reputational effect arising from negative media exposure would therefore 
result in a higher cost for the offender’s reputation. The business ethics literature confirms 
that the company’s reputation in general is fundamental to its image (Gray and Balmer, 1998) 
and to attracting quality partners (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), and that this is particularly 
true from the vantage point of its buyer/supplier relationships (Bendixen and Abratt, 2007).  
 
This is understandable, as the management literature has shown that unethical corporate acts 
have a detrimental effect on the quality of the organization’s network in terms of exchange 
partners. They alter the quality and the structure of the network: quality because the firm loses 
ground in terms of reputation, size and profitability, and structure because its legitimacy is 
undermined (Sullivan et al., 2007). Organizations that enjoy a good reputation also find that 
the latter plays a role as a substitute for costly governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1996). It 
follows that by amplifying the reputational effect, the law provides a deterrent that existing 
mechanisms such as codes of conduct could not offer. We know that business codes have 
limited efficacy, often because employees are unaware of their existence, because they 
conflict with sub-group norms (Harrington, 1996), or because they come second to efficient 
operations in employees’ estimation (Healy and Iles, 2002). Given the extensive publicity 
associated with the amplification of the reputational effect and the potential negative impact 
on key organizational assets such as brands and operating costs, a legal intervention will 
inevitably go beyond the limitations of business codes. Amplification of the reputational 
effect is likely to be a strong deterrent to UITU since it provides such a major incentive to 
organizations that host the potential offenders.  
 
Fourth, our results also demonstrate a paradox between two opposing results associated with 
intervention. Indeed, while we found that intervention was able to influence the cost-benefit 
analysis associated with UITU mitigation, we also discovered that it triggered the emergence 
of new forms of UITU. We know that IT users are social actors who dynamically and 
continuously negotiate their use of the technology (Lamb and Kling, 2003) and update their 
sense-making (Jasperson et al., 2005) and IT practices accordingly (Lamb and Kling, 2003). 
Our findings show that this negotiation of the technology can paradoxically trigger 
unexpected new cases of UITU. In our case, buyers tried to circumvent the law by adapting 
their use to exploit any available loophole. This situation prompted the legislator to intervene 
again in order to address the remaining gaps in the legislation. This finding highlights the 
paradox that can exist between the intentions of a legal intervention and the way IT users deal 
with it.  
 
In the information systems literature, Robey and Boudreau (1999) show that IT use can be 
associated with paradoxes or polarized pairs of outcomes such as organizational flexibility 
and organizational rigidity. For the authors, paradoxes create a tension between two or more 
apparently incongruous statements (decline in UITU and emergence of new types of UITU in 
our case). According to Robey and Boudreau (1999), the “acknowledgment of paradox can 
stimulate theory-building by provoking creative insights that accommodate seemingly 
opposite positions” (p. 169). In order to deal with such paradoxes, Robey and Boudreau 
(1999) suggest that the integration of contingency variables could lead to resolving the tension 
emanating from the paradoxes. Our findings suggest that any intervention that deals with 
UITU needs to be adapted to IT users’ new means of getting round it by being flexible and 
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ready to deal with the negotiation of the IT and the associated new UITU. 
 
Another emergent result is that while intervention is perceived as able to mitigate UITU, it 
can also have an unexpected effect in terms of the diminution or discontinuance of IT use. 
The increased constraints on IT use – complexity of the rules, tracing, controlling and risk of 
sanctions – makes some buyers less likely to continue their use of the technology.  
 
We also observed that the intervention increased the transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) 
associated with the use of the technology and altered buyers’ expectations of it (Bhattacherjee, 
2001), which led to a decline in use or its discontinuance. More specifically, we know that in 
their early days, ORAs were particularly appealing to buyers; they were presented as an easy-
to-use type of technology that could generate significant and rapidly available advantages by 
considerably enhancing purchasing performance and shortening the negotiation cycle (Smart 
and Harrison, 2003). However, the intervention dramatically shifted buyers’ perceptions of 
the technology from simple to complex. Buyers highlighted the complexity of the process and 
the burdensome preparatory work, which corresponded to an increase in transaction costs. The 
legal intervention also created the perception of ORAs as a risky endeavor, and one in which 
any mistake would be deemed an UITU that could lead to high individual and organizational 
costs.  
 
Finally, using the general principles of RCT, this means that buyers developed a new calculus, 
where they compared the benefits of IT use with the ‘new’ organizational and individual costs 
introduced by the legal intervention. While former research in other contexts has shown how 
intervention can trigger IT use (Liang et al., 2007; Purvis et al., 2001; Rodon et al., 2011), we 
found that the effect of the intervention targeted at mitigating UITU is much less 
straightforward, particularly when it changes the expected outcome of an IT’s use. This 
provides a sound theoretical explanation for the effect that we observed on the use of the IT in 
question in our study: buyers believed that the costs and risks generated by the new 
constraints arising from the intervention outweighed the expected advantages associated with 
it, and were therefore tempted to limit or even discontinue its use. Thus, by introducing 
transaction costs that outweighed the perceived comparative benefit of ORAs to alternative 
solutions, the intervention led to the limitation or discontinuance of use. This finding contrasts 
with widespread views on intervention in IS where it is only considered in its capacity to 
promote IT use, without consideration for the possible negative impact in terms of technology 
discontinuation. In effect, intervention in the IS literature has mainly been associated with 
positive outcomes such as effective electronic communication (Orlikowski et al., 1995), 
technological adaptation (Tyre and Orlikowksi, 1994) or interorganizational systems 
assimilation (Rodon et al., 2011). Neglecting this potential ‘dark side’ of legal intervention 
puts future interventions at risk of unexpected side effects on IT use. While we offer a first 
insight into the issue, further research is needed regarding the negative effects of intervention 
on IT use.  
 
Conclusion  
The aim of this study was to understand how legal intervention could mitigate UITU by 
influencing the cost–benefit analysis determining the decision to commit such UITU. This is 
especially important in view of previous evidence according to which business codes 
implemented by management and third parties are inefficient in dealing with UITU 
(Harrington, 1996; Healy and Iles, 2002), as well as the damaging effects of UITU on 
organizations and society more broadly. To this end, we examined the case of a legal 
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intervention specifically designed for ORAs, a highly controversial technology from an 
ethical standpoint.  
 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide testable propositions on the mechanisms 
through which legal intervention can impact UITU by affecting the cost-benefit analysis, and 
we discuss its complex and paradoxical effects on UITU and IT use more generally. Second, 
we offer an innovative take on intervention, according to which the latter is conceived and 
should be researched as a dynamic, multi-mechanism process that can adapt to UITU as well 
as to evolutions in IT use. 
 
First, the set of propositions depicts a complex and paradoxical picture of how legal 
intervention can impact UITU and IT use more generally. When we embarked upon our 
research, we expected to observe two types of mechanisms: some which would alter the cost-
benefit calculus determining the decision to commit UITU and some which would not. 
Instead, we encountered a far more intricate situation, in which the law has a differentiated 
and complex effect on use, with some unexpected consequences. While some of the 
mechanisms have the potential to alter IT users’ cost-benefit analysis to ultimately mitigate 
existing UITU, others can trigger new cases of UITU or discontinuance of use. This can be 
likened to the type of polarized outcomes deemed paradoxical by Robey and Boudreau 
(1999). It is only by understanding these differentiated and complex mechanisms that legal 
intervention can be improved. Therefore, instead of looking for black and white effects, 
unintended outcomes need to be added to the equation in order to adopt a more flexible and 
supple approach to intervention. 
 
Second, our results offer an innovative take on intervention in general, whereby the latter may 
be conceived as a dynamic multi-mechanism process that can adapt to both UITU and to 
evolutions in IT use. Our case study shows that the combination of various mechanisms is a 
key element in targeting diverse groups of users and stakeholders. We thus suggest that 
intervention should go beyond the unique instrument of sanctions. In effect, a combination of 
mechanisms can extend the impact of intervention in time and scope. Visibility, as defined in 
our case by the combination of records and ex-post controls, can increase the temporal 
horizons of potential sanctions, thus impacting on the risk of being caught in the future and 
accordingly affecting the cost-benefit analysis. The temporal dimension associated with 
visibility thus appears as an important dimension to take into account when working on 
intervention, especially in the context of IT use, where keeping records and analyzing such 
traces is made easier by the technologies themselves.  
 
Increasing the reputational effect could extend the scope of the intervention, creating an 
incentive for organizations and their members to prioritize mitigation of UITUs since such 
behavior increases their reputational and, potentially, their operational costs. This could 
encourage organizations to create stronger ex- ante organizational mechanisms that would be 
deeply embedded in the organizational culture, supporting the intervention, and thus being 
more efficient then existing business codes. We see this as a promising research avenue on 
remedies to UITU. 
 
Our findings also show that intervention should be considered as a dynamic process, 
continually adapting to the users’ negotiation of the technology. Our study improves our 
understanding of intervention in general by exploring how users’ adaptation and interventions 
shape one another through use. Our research thus acknowledges the fact that IT is an evolving 
system embedded in a complex and dynamic social context (Orlikowksi and Iacono, 2001). In 
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such a fast evolving environment as IT use, adaptability is a key success factor for 
intervention. Since emergent and unexpected effects could occur as users circumvent the 
technology, IT managers and management should understand that intervention is not a one-
shot process but needs to be designed in a flexible and evolving manner, conceived as a 
process rather than as a one-off act. We thus suggest that intervention should integrate the 
following criteria: articulating ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms, anticipating changes in UITU 
and IT use, and combining individual and organizational deterrents. These parameters 
constitute interesting research avenues for IS scholars seeking to explore organizational 
responses to UITU.  
 
Our findings have important implications for practitioners crafting intervention. Our 
distinction between the three mechanisms impacting on the cost-benefit analysis can be used 
as a basis for practice. Practitioners should take into account how these different mechanisms 
may be interpreted by various groups of stakeholders, and subsequently integrate the impact 
of intervention both on UITU and more generally on IT use, as well as developing a dynamic 
approach to intervention. Practitioners need to craft proactive intervention practices in line 
with the principles captured in our propositions. This is crucial in contexts where ubiquitous 
digital technologies involving unprecedented numbers of actors are continuously developing, 
as in the case of social media-related technologies. 
 
One of the limitations of this study is that our conclusions are based on the interpretation of 
actors on how the cost-benefit analysis will be conducted by potential offenders. While we 
interviewed actors that were directly concerned by the issue and our propositions are backed 
up by our empirical findings, it was beyond the scope of this study to measure the actual 
impact of intervention on the evolution of UITU. This would require the collection of 
quantitative data over an extended period of time, something that would certainly be a 
worthwhile endeavor for future research.  
 
In addition, because they emanate from a single case study in a specific context, our 
propositions would need to be tested in different contexts and in relation to different 
technologies, types of UITU, and forms of intervention before being generalized. We are 
confident that our general results – portraying intervention as a multi-mechanism dynamic 
process that can adapt to the evolution of UITU and IT use – is likely to be operative in other 
IT settings and for other forms of intervention; this is particularly true given the dynamic 
nature of IT and IT use.  
 
However, there is still much to learn about specific combinations of mechanisms and their 
sequences in different contexts and in relation to different groups of stakeholders. In 
particular, research could explore discontinuation further by investigating in more detail 
which actors choose to discontinue use in which context. It would also be fruitful to use other 
experimental designs in order to test our propositions. We also propose testing our 
propositions in relation to other forms of intervention that directly or indirectly influence the 
RCT calculus associated with UITU, whether it is within or between organizations. Another 
related topic would be to explore the extent to which these different forms of intervention 
complement one another. Finally, more exploratory research is also needed on the modi 
operandi of various forms of intervention.  
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Table A1. Groups of informants and their adaptation to the research question 
Categories of 
informants 
Sampling details Rationale for inclusion in the study 
 
IT users who were 
blamed for UITU  
(Buyers) 
 
Twenty-nine buyers: 26 buyers and 3 
buyers’ managers  
Buyers represent the stakeholders who benefit the most 
from the UITU. Buyers were identified as the party with 
the greatest responsibility for UITU. 
 







Suppliers are providers of industrial goods who are pre-
selected by the buyers to take part in the online bidding 
event. They represent the stakeholders who benefit the 
least from the technology’s use. The legal intervention 

















Vice President of the French Competition 
Authority  
The Competition Authority and the Directorate for 
Competition Policy are the two main institutions that 
regulate business relationships. They were involved in 
the design of the legal intervention.  
Legal representative of the General 
Directorate for Competition Policy, 
Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control  
The Economic Expert within the General 
Directorate for Competition Policy, 
Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control 
The Directorate for Competition Policy asked an 
economic expert to estimate the outcomes linked to 
UITU. 
A representative of the Examination 
Commission of Good Business Practices 
Due to UITU, the first two institutions asked the 
commission to investigate the extent to which the use of 
ORAs was consistent with ethics. 
The legal representative studying the legal 
appropriation of ORAs (the mandate for 
the study was undertaken by the 
Examination Commission of Good 
Business Practices)  
The Examination Commission of Good Business 
Practices asked a legal expert in business relationships to 
investigate the extent to which ORA use was in line with 







use led to UITU 
 
 
Manager of the B2B Projects & 
Organization  
Sales Manager for B2B Applications 
ORA Coordinator  
NeoGrid (ex-Agentrics) Senior Sourcing 
Manager 
The role of the technology initiators was to promote, 
convince, and support the use of all e-procurement 
technologies (including ORAs) by buyers and suppliers. 
The technology initiators were the first supporters of the 
ORAs technology.  
 
 





the case of ORAs) 
The lawyer was mandated by the 
European Commission to investigate 
unethical behavior within European B2B 
Electronic Market Places 
Due to the frequency of UITU at the European level, the 
European commission mandated an international legal 
expert in the judicial investigations of the ethical issues 
linked to ORA use. We interviewed the lawyer who was 
responsible of assembling the different feedback of the 
legal experts.  
Two European legal experts in the 
treatment of affairs linked to B2B 
technologies such as B2B ORAs  






Table A2. Research assessment according to the seven principles of interpretive studies (Klein and Myers, 1999) 
The principles of 
interpretive research 
(Klein and Myers, 1999) 
Definition Application to our interpretive research 
1. The fundamental 
principle of the 
hermeneutic circle 
Achieving a permanent iteration between the 
interdependent meaning of parts and the whole they 
form. 
Our case study satisfied this principle in two ways. First, we iterated between the detailed 
account of concrete manifestations of the intervention and its mitigation of UITU and the 
broader context of IT use. Second, RCT served as an interpretive framework to articulate our 
propositions, thus supporting our rationale. Third, the approach to coding directly allows for 
the progressive consolidation of first order codes into aggregated dimensions. 
2. The principle of 
contextualization 
Use of critical thinking regarding the social and 
historical background to the research so as to give the 
reader a sense of the way the current situation has 
emerged. 
We paid special attention to the context in which the intervention was taking place. This was 
achieved in particular through the collection of extensive documentation before beginning 
the study. In the method section, we present the context to help the reader contextualize our 
results and propositions.  
3. The principle of 
interaction between the 
researchers and the 
subjects 
Critical reflection on how the research materials and 
data were socially constructed through interactions 
between the researchers and participants.  
This research was the second collaboration between the first researcher and the retail 
organization. The first collaboration occurred between June 2005 and April 2006. This 
facilitated an understanding of the actors’ discourse based on inter-subjectivity. However, 
only one other researcher was also involved in coding. This means that a critical perspective 
of the social construction of the research material was achieved through discussions between 
the three researchers, who each had a different level of engagement with the participants.  
4. The principle of 
abstraction and 
generalization 
Relating idiographic details revealed by data 
interpretation through the application of principles one 
and two to theoretical, general concepts that describe 
the nature of human understanding and social action. 
The researchers made a significant effort to design an ensemble of empirically embedded 
propositions linked to the expected and emergent effects of intervention on UITU. To do 
this, the researchers relied on an iterative process integrating the data and the theoretical 
insights gained from the RCT.  
5. The principle of 
dialogical reasoning 
Revelation of possible contradictions between the 
theoretical preconceptions guiding the research design 
and the actual findings with subsequent cycles of 
revision. 
While the general principles of RCT were respected, the scope of its application and the 
results observed were in part unexpected. We were able to move beyond our preconception 
of the expected results thanks to our approach to coding, the first stage of which was open 
coding.  
6. The principle of 
multiple interpretations 
Identification of any difference in interpretation within 
or between the groups of interviewees as they can be 
expressed in multiple narratives or stories of the same 
sequence of events under study. 
It is acknowledged that data analysis that emanates from interpretive research is not confined 
to facts but also involves the researchers’ own subjectivity; hence, it includes the 
researchers’ interpretations of other people’s interpretations (Walsham, 1995). We tackled 
this in two ways. Our data analysis explicitly recognized and highlighted any possible 
tensions between the interpretations made by our informants. Such tensions led us to a 
nuanced interpretation of the answers to our research question.  
7. The principle of 
suspicion 
Identification of plausible biases and systematic 
distortions in the narratives collected from the 
participants.  
We gathered multiple narratives from different informants in each category of actors, but 
also across categories (i.e., not only buyers and suppliers but also IT initiators, institutional 
actors, and lawyers). The IT users’ interpretations were thus contrasted with the 
interpretations of the other groups of informants, but also in relation to other informants from 
the same group. The researchers also discussed the findings with the key informants and with 







Table B1. Codes used for data analysis 
 
First-order codes   Second-order codes Aggregated dimensions  
Formalization of UITU Formalization of the meaning of UITU 





Framework of reference; meaning of UITU; 
sanctions; costs 
Enforceability; legal grounds; risks of sanction; 
generic sanctions 
Perceived cost 
Information; attention; meaning; 
interpretation/rumor 
Ambiguity of UITU  
Visibility  
Being seen; transparency; control plans; tracing 
transactions 
Tracing IT use; controlling IT use 
Mediatization; reputational effect; vilification; 
loss of trust; risk of being caught; incentives; 
organizational costs 
 
Amplification of the reputational effect 
 
Reputational effect 
Cheating; abusive practices geographic loophole; 
temporal loophole 
 
Negotiation of IT use 
 
New UITU 
Revision of the cost the offender will pay when 
caught 
Revision of the scope of the intervention 
 
 
Revision of the intervention  
 
Adaptability of the 
intervention  
Difficulty to organize ORAs; complexity; risks 
of controls 
 




Decrease of IT use 







First legal intervention  
 
No. 0179, Page 12639, Clause No. 2  
 
“- I. A contract is not valid (…) in the event that the organized reverse e-auction has not respected one of the 
following principles: 
 
1. Preliminary to the auction, the buyer or the person organizing the auction communicates in a transparent way, 
and without any discrimination, to all the candidates allowed to bid for the determining elements of the products 
or services he/she seeks to obtain, the purchasing terms and conditions, the detailed selection criteria, as well as 
the rules applying to the auction; 
2. At the end of the auction period, the identity of the selected supplier shall be disclosed at the request of any 
candidate who has participated in the auction; 
- II. The buyer or the person organizing the auction shall register the progress of the auction and shall store the 
data for a period of one year. The buyer can be represented in the event that an investigation is carried out, under 
the conditions foreseen in section V of the Commercial Code; 
- III. Reverse e-auctions organized by a buyer or by his/her representative are prohibited in the case of 
agricultural products (…) and staple food products resulting from an initial transformation of these products; 
- IV. Not respecting provisions I to III engages the responsibility of the offender and obliges him/her to repair the 
damage caused (…). 
In addition to the obligation to pay damages, the law also lays down severe prison sentences (2 years) and fines 
(up to €30,000) for price manipulation in reverse e-auctions, especially if the price manipulation takes place in 
one of the following ways: 
- by diffusing, via any means, deceptive or libelous information; 
- by introducing into the market or soliciting either offers intended to trouble the market prices, or unbalanced 
high or low bids, in relation to the prices requested by the sellers or service providers; 






Second legal intervention  
 
No. 303, Page 20557, Clause No. 123  
 
“Article L. 442-10 of the Commercial Code sanctions by nullity all contracts organized through remote reverse 
auctions, including by electronic means, and that do not meet any one of the formal rules prescribed in this 
article.  
 
Article L. 442-6 (I, 5) of the Code sets the minimum period of notice in case of abrupt termination of business 
relationships resulting from a competition by distance auction at twice that resulting from applying the same 
paragraph where the duration of the initial notice is less than six months, and at least one year in all other cases. 
Any infringement of this rule shall incur the civil liability of the offender and expose him or her to a fine of 2 
million euros in accordance with paragraph III of Article L. 442-6 of the Commercial Code. 
 
The relocation of platforms organizing ORAs in remote sites outside the country raises the issue of law 
enforcement in space. Regarding the liability of the buyer or the person who arranges the auction on his/her 
behalf, it is necessary to consult the applicable case law. Thus, the law of the place of prejudice shall apply in 
such cases (Lautour, civ. May 25, 1948). In the case of dissociation between the event and the injury, the place of 
prejudice covers both that where the damage was generated and the place where the damage occurred (Civ. I, 
May 11, 1999). The reverse auction venue can easily be moved and is therefore not significant. Accordingly, the 
applicable law is the law where the prejudice occurred, in other words, the law of the place where the supplier 
incurs prejudice. Moreover, if the nullity of contracts does not meet the requirements of Article L. 442-10 of the 
Commercial Code, then it falls within the domain of criminal. This applies to all contracts that are intended to 
supply a buyer with goods for resale in France.  
 
If the revocation or civil liability proceedings are brought before a civil or commercial court by the Minister of 
Economy in accordance with paragraphs III and IV of Article L. 442-6 of the Code, the offender’s business 
organization shall incur a fine of two million euros. Article L. 443-2 criminalizes the act of operating the 
artificial lowering of the price of goods or services by introducing on the market or soliciting offers below the 
prices charged by vendors or service providers.” 
 
